• Phone: 617-353-3631
  • E-Mail:  wsamuels@bu.edu
  • Website: http://management.bu.edu
  • Office: 530
  • Office Hours: By Appointment
  • Address: Boston University Questrom School of Business
    595 Commonwealth Avenue
    Boston, MA 02215
  • Education Open or Close

    Ph D, Harvard University, Economics, 1978.

    BA, Harvard College, Applied Mathematics, 1974.

  • PublicationsOpen or Close

    Journal Articles:

      Samuelson, W. F. (1998). Settlements Out of Court: Efficiency and Equity. Group Decision and Negotiation, 7,

      Samuelson, W. F., Lindsey, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1996). Selling Procedures with Private Information and Common Values. Management Science, 220-231. Hanover, MD.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1995). Computer-Aided Negotiation and Economic Analysis. Negotiation Journal, 35-44.

      Bodie, Z., Merton, R., & Samuelson, W. F. (1992). Labor Supply Flexibility and Portfolio Choice in a Life-Cycle Model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 15, Amsterdam.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1991). Final-Offer Arbitration Under Incomplete Information. Management Science, 1234-47. Hanover, MD.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Zeckhauser, R. (1989). Status Quo Bias and Insurance Markets. The John Liner Review, 38-50.

      Samuelson, W. F., Johnson, S., & Kotlikoff, L. (1988). Consumption, Computation Mistakes, and Fiscal Policy. American Economic Review, 408-512.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status Quo Bias in Decision Making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7-59.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Hansen, R. (1988). Evolution in Economic Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 315-338. Amsterdam.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1987). Auctions with Contingent Payments. American Economic Review, 740-745.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1986). Bidding for Contracts. Management Science, 1533-1550. Hanover, MD.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Rosenthal, L. (1986). Price Movements as Indicators of Tender Success. Journal of Finance, 481-499. New York, NY.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1985). Dividing Coastal Waters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 83-111.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1985). Competitive Bidding with Entry Costs. Economic Letters, 53-57.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1984). Bargaining under Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 995-1005.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Bazerman, M. (1983). I Won the Auction but Don't Want the Prize. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 618-634.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Chatterjee, K. (1983). Bargaining under Incomplete Information. Operations Research, 835-851. Linthicum, MD.

      Samuelson, W. F., & Riley, J. (1981). Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review, 381-393.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1980). First-Offer Bargains. Management Science, 155-165. Hanover, MD.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1980). The Object-Distribution Problem Revisited. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85-98. Cambridge, MA.


      Samuelson, W. F., & Marks, S. (2014). Managerial Economics.8th Edition, 551. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

      Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. F. (2013). Game Theory and Business Applications.2, 385. New York, New York: Springer Publishers (International Series in Operations Research and Management Science).

    Book Chapters:

      Samuelson, W. F., & Chatterjee, K. (2013). Introduction to Game Theoretic Models, in Game Theory and Business Applications New York: Springer.

      Samuelson, W. F. (2013). Auctions: Advancing Theory and Practice, in Game Theory and Business Applications New York: Springer.

      Samuelson, W. F. (2013). A Game-Theoretic Approach to Legal Settlements, in Game Theory and Business Applications New York: Springer.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1996). in Market Entry under Incomplete Information, in R. Keeney, J. Sebenius, and R. Zeckhauser, Wise Choices: Games Decisions, and Negotiations : Harvard Business School Press, pp 272-297.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1985). in A Comment on the Coase Theorem, in A. Roth (Ed.), Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining : Cambridge University Press, pp 321-339.

      Samuelson, W. F. (1983). in Competitive Bidding for Defense Contracts, in R. Englebrecht-Wiggans et al (Eds.), Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory : New York University Press, pp 389-419.